Abstract. The white box attack context as described in [1, 2] is the common setting where cryptographic software is executed in an untrusted environment-i.e. an attacker has gained access to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms, and can observe or manipulate the dynamic execution of whole or part of the algorithms. In this paper, we present an efficient practical attack against the obfuscated AES implementation [1] proposed at SAC 2002 as a means to protect AES software operated in the white box context against key exposure. We explain in details how to extract the whole AES secret key embedded in such a white box AES implementation, with negligible memory and worst time complexity 2 30 .
Introduction
One of the consequences of the ever spreading use of cryptology within mass applications-e.g. email, web servers access, digital content distribution, and so on-implemented in software on standard terminals, like pcs, pdas, or mobile phones, is that cryptologic algorithms are quite often executed in an untrusted environment. The usual "black box" model, where keys and cryptographic algorithms are confined and executed in a logically protected and tamper resistant cryptographic module, like a smart card, is no longer applicable. This situation motivated the introduction of a new setting, coined "white box" context of execution: the software representing cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic keys when separate from the cryptographic software, and dynamic data produced during the execution of all or part of the cryptographic algorithms, are exposed to being accessed or even manipulated by malicious processes hosted by the same machine-which may be controlled either by an outsider or by the legitimate user of the host terminal. Cryptographic applications running in the white box context of execution are highly vulnerable to the most severe form work performed at France Télécom R&D of attack, namely the leakage of the cryptographic keys. Thus, the protection cryptographic algorithms would offer in the black box model of execution vanish.
This security issue is at the origin of the introduction, in a pair of seminal articles [2, 1] S. Chow, P. Eisen, H. Johnson, and P.C. van Oorschot, of a new protection technique preventing from key leakage for cryptographic software run in the white box context. It consists in implementing key-instantiated versions of an algorithm, as the composition of a series of lookup tables, each look-up table concealing some components of the algorithm. Implementations of an algorithm resulting from this protection technique are named white-box implementations. White box implementations of the DES and AES blockciphers were respectively described in [2] and [1] . Short after the publication of [2] , it was shown by M. Jacob, D. Boneh and D. Felten in [3] , that the obfuscation technique applied in [2] was insecure, i.e. that a low complexity attack requiring few accesses (with partly chosen input values) to lookup tables representing external DES rounds, allowed to extract the key from a white box DES implementation. However, the attack technique of [3] is not applicable to the white box implementation of AES described in [1] due to the additional protection provided by some extra features introduced by [1] . More precisely, a fundamental difference between both implementations results from the application, in the case of AES, of socalled external encodings. One of the main security consequences of this extra feature-which description is provided in Sec. 2-is that in the case of AES, and unlike DES, the protection of external rounds is not weaker than the protection of internal rounds. Since the attack strategy of [3] is essentially based upon the extra weakness of external rounds, it is not applicable to the AES implementation described in [1] . To the best of our knowledge, no realistic attack against the white box implementation of [1] has been proposed so far.
In this paper, we present a practical low complexity attack-i.e. with negligible memory, and work factor 3·2 28 < 2 30 -of the AES white box implementation proposed in [1] . The conducting idea of the attack is that though none of the lookup tables, when considered individually, leaks sensitive information related to the AES key in an obvious way, the analysis (based on the observation of related input/output values) of lookup tables composition, reveals information on the encodings embedded in those lookup tables. We show that the information provided by the analysis of such tables during three consecutive encoded rounds, allows an attacker to entirely recover the AES 128-bit secret key of an obfuscated AES implementation. The key steps of the proposed attack were successfully implemented in C++, and confirmed by computer experiments. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the white box AES implementation as proposed by [1] . In Section 3 we show how to extract the secret key. The last section concludes the paper.
Description of the White Box AES Implementation
We now describe the implementation proposed in [1] . The general strategy is to merge several steps of the AES round function into table lookups, blended by input/output encodings, and mixing bijections.
Internal encodings (resp. mixing bijections) are non-linear (resp. GF(2)-linear) and introduce confusion (resp. diffusion) in the representation of the intermediate blocks of the computation. Their inclusion in the implementation must respect the fact that two consecutive tables in the data flow have matching output and input encodings, as well as matching mixing bijections, at their boundary.
Apart from the above pairwise canceling internal transformations, another obfuscation technique called external encoding is used. It consists in feeding the obfuscated implementation with AES inputs in an encoded form. At the same time, the implementation also outputs the AES encrypted values in an encoded form. Thus, the implementation does not exactly achieve an AES computation
The external input/output encodings G and F −1 have to be annihilated on the peer site-e.g. a server when the AES obfuscated implementation is embedded in a software player-in order to compute E suggested in [1] are hereafter taken into account, our attack is not highly dependent upon their exact specification. One of the main consequences of using external encodings is that internal input/output encodings can be used to blend the first and last round, in addition to inner rounds' blending. This prevents attackers from exploiting specific weaknesses one would otherwise encounter against external rounds of obfuscated implementations [3] .
Let us hereafter denote AES-128 the AES version operating on 128 bits blocks. Recall [4, 5] that the AES-128 round function is made of the four steps described in Fig. 1 [1] consists of 10 such rounds; a preliminary AddRoundKey step is performed before the first round, and MixColumns is omitted in the final round. Let us index the state bytes by their row and column numbers (i, j) in the state array. If the S-box function operating on bytes during the SubBytes step is denoted by S, define for any round r and any byte (i, j) with indexes taken modulo 4:
(Note that we shifted the round index of the original AES-128 by 1, and that the post-whitening key k 11 i,j occuring in the last round is absorbed by the definition of the last function T 10 i,j .) Now each 4-byte column of the output of the SubByte plus ShiftRows steps will contribute to the 4-byte column of the state array after MixColumns, and those four bytes are related to the former by a 32 × 8 submatrix MC i of the 32 × 32 matrix MC representing MixColumns. Now the entire function can be described by a lookup table. However, it is necessary to obfuscate this table, which leads to encode its 4-bit input and output nibblesusing concatenated non-linear permutations in and out respectively.
To add to the diffusion, 8 × 8 affine "mixing" bijection is inserted before T r i,j and a 32 × 32 affine bijection MB is inserted after the MixColumn part. The resulting lookup table is depicted in Fig. 2 as the sub Thus, in order to implement a white box instance of AES-128 associated with a key K, 9 · 4 · 4 sub tables, 9 · 4 · 4 untwist tables, 9 · 4 · 3 · 8 xor tables supporting sub tables, 9 · 4 · 3 · 8 xor tables supporting untwist tables, 2 · 16 extern encode tables, and 2 · 15 · 32 xor tables supporting extern encode tables are needed. Therefore, the total size of lookup tables in an AES-128 white box implementation is 770 048 bytes.
Cryptanalysis of the White Box AES Implementation
We now describe a very efficient attack against the white box AES implementation of [1] . The leading idea is that, though recovering information about the key by a local inspection of the lookup tables seems difficult-lookup tables were designed to satisfy so-called diversity and ambiguity criteria-recovering information by analyzing compositions of lookup tables corresponding to one encoded AES round is easier. More precisely, it is convenient to analyze each of the four mappings between four bytes of the input state array, and the four corresponding bytes of the output state array, which together form an encoded AES round. Each such mapping can be conceptualized by the box in Fig. 5 , where we can choose inputs and observe outputs, whereas intermediate values remain concealed. Let us denote this box by R r j . Each R r j box is made of four 8-bit to 8-bit parasitic input permutations P r i,j (resp. output permutations Q r i,j ) constructed as the composition of two concatenated 4-bit to 4-bit input (resp. output) encodings, and one 8-bit to 8-bit linear mixing bijection. Due to the fact that internal input encodings plus linear mixing bijections and linear mixing bijections plus output encodings mutually cancel out at the boundary between two rounds r and r + 1, each Q r i,j is the inverse of P r+1 i,j . The attack proceeds in three steps. First of all, we recover the non-affine part of the parasites Q r i in round r = 1, . . . , 9, i.e. we determine Q r i up to unknown affine bijections, and thus get at the same time the non-affine part of the inverse P GF(2)-affine, except for the permutation P 1 i,j whose non-affine part has not been determined. In a second step, we recover those GF(2)-affine mappings (but P 1 i,j and Q 1 i,j ), first up to an unknown GF(2 8 )-affine bijection, and then entirely. Eventually combining all this information in a third step, we extract the AES-128 key.
Recovering Non-Linear Parts
Consider the mapping R r j . We are trying to remove the non-linearity in the parasites (Q r i ) i=0,...,3 . To this end consider y 0 as a function of (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), and fix the values of x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 to some constants, say c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 . One easily checks that there exists two constants in GF(2 8 ), namely α independent of c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , and β c1,c2,c3 , such that
Since x only takes 256 values, those mappings are known by input/output, as well as their inverses. Also, varying one constant (say c 3 ) into the whole GF(2 8 ), and keeping the other one fixed, has the effect that β c1,c2,c 3 takes all the values in GF(2 8 ). We are thus able to produce-as lookup tables, of course-all the functions
where β = β c1,c2,c 3 ⊕ β c1,c2,c3 takes all the values in GF(2 8 ). This leads to the problem of recovering Q 0 , or at least its non-linear part from the set of all those lookup tables. Note that since functions are given as lookup tables, we are not provided with the underlying translations: we only know the unordered set of functions corresponding to the 256 translations. As this problem is of independent interest, we state it, along with a solution, in a standalone context.
given by values, where Q is a permutation of GF (2 8 ) and ⊕ β is the translation by β in GF(2 8 ), one can construct a particular solution Q such that there exists an affine mapping A so that Q = Q • A.
Proof. There is an isomorphism between the commutative groups GF (2) 8 , ⊕ and (S, •), given by ϕ : 
-this can easily be done by gradually selecting f 1 to f 8 so that they span the whole set S through composition, that is
where f (2) 8 , ⊕ . One checks that ψ can be efficiently recovered, by using the unique decomposition given by Eq. 2. Indeed, for any f ∈ S the unique tuple of binary values (ε 1 , . . . , ε 8 ) verifying Eq. 2 is easily computed-an exhaustive search would be quick enough, but we give a better algorithm at the end of this paragraph. By successively applying ϕ
and L −1 to f , one obtains
Thus the isomorphism ψ is entirely determined.
Let us explain how to recover Q from the knowledge of ψ, up to an unknown affine transformation A. For that purpose, consider the commutative diagram of Fig. 6 , and define the GF(2)-affine one-to-one mapping A by
and let us set
One verifies that Q −1 ('00') = ['00']. By applying the above definition of Q, or equivalently by inspecting the commutative diagram of Fig.6 , one checks that
From our knowledge of ψ and f , we can therefore compute Q = Q • A.
Now, we propose an efficient algorithm-time complexity is at most 2 24 -that chooses a tuple (f 1 , . . . , f 8 ) on the fly, and computes the corresponding mapping ψ. It was successfully implemented in C++.
Going back to our initial motivation, Theorem 1 enables us to recover for any round r = 1, . . . , 9, the non-linear part Q where all P and Q are non-linear and matching, to one where they are affine and still matching. The next step is to recover those affine mappings, which is the subject of next sections.
Relations Between Affine Parasites
So let us start again with the setting depicted in Fig.5 , except for the fact that all parasitic mappings P r i,j and Q r i,j are now affine. Since the problem is identical for each round, we drop the subscripts r and j without loss of generality. We have access to the following functions as lookup tables
ith the shortcut T i = T i • P i . Actually there is one more issue, which is that we do know the set {y i } i=0,...,3 but we do not know the labels to put on each function. Put in another way, we know those functions have the general form
ut we do not know what the underlying coefficients α i,j occurring from the MixColumn step are. Let us hereafter denote by Λ α the matrix over GF (2) 8 of the multiplication by α.
Before going any further, let us state a very useful property. Though simple, it is a corner stone in the strategy we designed for the affine parasites' recovery, as well as in resolving the above mentioned renaming issue. Proposition 1. For any pair (y i , y j ) as introduced above, there exists a unique linear mapping L and a unique constant c such that, ∀x 0 ∈ GF(2 8 ), y i (x 0 , '00', '00', '00') = L (y j (x 0 , '00', '00', '00')) ⊕ c .
Proof. Decompose the affine maps Q i (x) = A i (x) ⊕ q i and Q j (x) = A j (x) ⊕ q j , where A i and A j are linear, q i and q j constants. Hence,
Thus, by taking
. 3 holds, which shows the existence of a solution.
The other way round, assuming there is a linear mapping L and a constant c such that Eq. 3 holds, amounts to saying that (
j , which uniquely defines L. Then α i,0 ·y i ⊕L•α j,0 ·y j is constant, and this constant uniquely defines c.
Obviously, there are analogous statements where one varies the second, third, or fourth variable and keep the other one constant. Also note that given two functions y i and y j , there is a straightforward practical algorithm to get the corresponding affine mapping (L, c) connecting their affine parts together. Indeed, considering the 64 entries of the matrix L as well as the 8 entries of the constant vector of c as unknowns over GF (2) , and using our knowledge of the functions y i and y j by values, one can form a highly overdefined linear system of 2 8 × 8 equations involving the 72 unknowns and solve it with time complexity much lower than 2 16 .
Recovering the Affine Parasites
We note that Prop. 1 of the previous section enables us to directly compute the linear parts of Q 1 , Q 2 , and Q 3 from the knowledge of Q 0 's linear part. We will therefore focus on Q 0 's determination. This section is organized in two steps. First, we show how to recover the linear part of Q 0 up to Λ γ , for some nonzero γ in GF (2 8 ). Then we show how this information can be used to recover both γ and the constant part q 0 of Q 0 .
About Q 0 's Linear Part Let us recall that we decompose each affine transformation Q i into its linear and constant parts:
1 . Then, using the variant of Prop. 1 with i = 0 and j = 1, but where one varies
Remembering that values α are standing for the MixColumn coefficients-i.e., taking their values in the set {'01', '02', '03'}-only 16 values for β remain possible, which are collected in the following set B = {'02', 'd8', '03', '6f', '04', 'bc', '06', 'b7', '05', '25', '4a', 'f8', '7f', 'c8', '64', '5f'} .
(One checks that no element of B is contained in any subfield of GF(2 8 ).) Thus, the new starting point is a matrix L, with the form A 0 • Λ β • A −1 0 , and we want to retrieve both β and A 0 . Given that β is chosen from B, computing the characteristic polynomial of L reduces the number of possibilities for β to at most 2; actually, either β is already determined, or β ∈ {b, b 2 } ⊂ B. To ease the exposition, we assume that β is known, for instance by testing the two possibilities, and using Prop. 3 of the next section to determine the correct one. i . The commutativity constraint is then expressed by
Since β is not contained in any subfield of GF (2 8 ), this in turn implies γ i = '00' for all i but i = 0. Therefore, as announced, A(x) = γ 0 x.) Thus, there exists a unique γ ∈ GF(2 8 ) such that A = Λ γ , and remembering that A = A
Now we only have to recover γ of Prop. 2 in order to fully determine A 0 , the linear part of Q 0 . In the following paragraph we explain how to compute it, as well as the constant part q 0 of Q 0 , that is to recover Q 0 entirely.
Recovering P i up to the Key, and Q 0 Let us return to the function we originally studied, namely
Remember that T i stands for the key addition, followed by the AES-128's S-box application, that is T i (z) = S(z ⊕k i ). Hence, the mapping
We have the following: Proposition 3. There exists unique pairs (δ i , c i ) i=0,...,3 of elements in GF(2 8 ), δ i being non-zero, such that
0 ) y 0 (x, '00', '00', '00') ⊕ c 0 ,
are affine mappings. Any pair (δ i , c i ) can be computed with time complexity 2 24 . Moreover, those mappings are exactly
Proof. The proposition amounts to saying that x → S −1 (δ ·S(x)⊕c) is affine and non-constant. Since S represent the AES-128 S-box, and δ in non-zero, this is only possible if (δ, c) = ('01', '00'), hence the existence and uniqueness of (δ i , c i ). (This is also very easy to verify by an exhaustive search, which we have done.) Since c is '00', we have c 0 = y 0 (x, '00', '00', '00') ⊕ α 0,0 · T 0 (P 0 (x)), and since
, where k 0 is a byte of the corresponding round key. As shown above, δ 0 · γ · α 0,0 must be '01', hence P 0 (x) = P 0 (x) ⊕ k 0 . The proof goes the same for P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 .
For every possible values for the pairs (δ i , c i )-there are 2 16 possible pairswe test if the corresponding mapping is affine. The lookup table has to be evaluated 2 8 times, and then 8 systems of 9 unknowns over GF(2), or equivalently one system of 72 unknowns which can be precomputed, has to be solved. Since the mapping evaluation through the lookup table dominates, the total time complexity is bounded by 2 24 .
Since δ
= γ · α 0,i , and given the fact that two of those α 0,i are '01', another is '02' and the last one is '03', exactly two of the δ −1 i are equal and share the common value γ. Therefore we know Λ γ , and thus the matrix A 0 = A 0 • Λ γ , as well as the underlying MixColumn coefficients α 0,i .
Also note that we recover at the same time the constant q 0 of the affine mapping Q 0 . Indeed, let us define c 4 = y 0 ('00', '00', '00', '00'). Considering Eq. 4, it can also be written as
Then, remembering that
which holds for every x and thus in particular for '00', we easily check that the constant part of Q 0 is given by q 0 = c 0 ⊕ c 1 ⊕ c 2 ⊕ c 3 ⊕ c 4 , which achieves to fully recover the mapping Q 0 .
Putting Everything Together
Let us now summarize the whole process of recovering the white box AES-128 implementation's original parasites. In Sec. 3.1 we have shown how to compute, for any round r = 1, . . . , 9 and any index j = 0, . . . , 3, with time complexity 2 24 , the non-linear part of any parasitic mapping Q r i,j , i = 0, . . . , 3-and thus at the same time, the non-linear part of its inverse parasitic mapping P r+1 i,j -up to some affine application x → A r i (x) ⊕ q r i . Section 3.2 showed how to recover A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 from the knowledge of A 0 , with time complexity lower than 3 · 2 16 . Finally, Sec. 3.3 explained how to recover the affine mapping x → A r 0 (x) ⊕ q r 0 , for r = 2, . . . , 9, with time complexity lower than 2 16 . At the same time, Sec. 3.3 also retrieved the missing affine part of P r i,j up to the key addition, which will allow us, as explained in the next section, to extract the key embedded in the AES-128 white box implementation.
Hence the time complexity to compute the parasites for a complete obfuscated AES-128 round, is bounded by 4 · 4 · 2 24 = 2 28 .
Key Extraction
We now give the procedure for the key extraction. The white box implementation of AES-128 key embeds round keys produced by the AES-128 key derivation algorithm. Thus the keys for two different rounds are related to each other. Using this property, one can obviously ease the recovery of the keys. In a first step, we determine Q r i,j 's non-linear part for some round plus the entire parasites of two consecutive AES-128 obfuscated rounds. For instance, recover the parasitic mappings Q 2 i,j , as well as P i,j , however they are not necessarily in the right order. Still, the data flow exposed by the implementation, rules the way each round r key bytes relates to the next round r + 1 key bytes. If we assumeaccording to Sec. 3.1 of [1] -that the round keys were generated using the key derivation algorithm of AES-128, the added constraint between the 16 bytes k 3 i,j and the 16 bytes k 4 i,j allows us to rearrange them the right way. Thus, having correctly recovered an AES-128 round key, we are able to derive the whole set of round keys.
